Tag: hiring strategy

  • Why expanding between similar markets is harder than it looks

    Why expanding between similar markets is harder than it looks

    Funnelback’s North American business started with one person. He was a senior salesman in Australia with family in New York, and he spent time poking around the US market to work out how it operated. Later it grew into a Brit, an Aussie and a Swiss guy trying to figure out the country together. The shared language suggested far more would transfer than did. Customs, company structures and even payments worked differently. Government procurement in the US runs on its own logic, and higher education is organized differently too, spread across far more institutions than a team used to the Australian market expects.

    I helped make that expansion happen, then took over global marketing and re-engaged Europe, where the company already had a presence. Funnelback was a Canberra-based enterprise search company with customers across Australia, New Zealand, the UK, Europe, the US and Canada, and moving between markets that look alike from a distance was a large share of the job.

    The experience is common enough to have a name in the research. In 1996 Shawna O’Grady and Henry Lane studied 32 Canadian retailers that had expanded into the United States and found that only seven had succeeded (JIBS). They called the pattern the psychic distance paradox: managers who saw the US as an extension of home were less inclined to study it, and the closeness they assumed was the thing that hurt them. The same study surveyed Canadian CEOs and found the cultural gaps between the two countries were larger than executives expected.

    The familiarity trap

    Later research has mostly reinforced O’Grady and Lane’s finding. A 2002 study of international retailers by Evans and Mavondo found greater psychic distance associated with better performance (JIBS), which fits the idea that companies work harder in markets they know are foreign. A 2015 experiment with 200 Australian managers found that confirmation bias changed how distant a market seemed, which in turn changed how risky it looked and how they chose to enter it (JIBS). The mechanism is ordinary. When early meetings go smoothly and nobody needs an interpreter, a team reads the absence of friction as proof that the playbook transfers, and it stops looking for the places where it doesn’t.

    Trade agencies say the same thing in plainer language. The UK’s Department for Business and Trade runs export sessions warning businesses that a common language hides real cultural differences (DBT). A former UK trade official in the US wrote that British firms arrive with a false sense of security, partly because American culture feels so familiar from film and television (FCDO).

    Similarity does lower some costs, and it would be wrong to pretend otherwise. Pankaj Ghemawat’s work on distance shows that shared language and historical ties substantially increase trade between countries, and he treats them as genuine advantages (HBR). Canada’s export agency describes shared language and culture as part of what makes the US an accessible first market (EDC). The argument here is narrower. Similarity reduces the cost of entry while hiding the cost of adaptation, and companies tend to budget for the first and forget the second.

    What the failures have in common

    The best-documented failures between similar markets are in retail, because retail failures happen in public. Target planned its Canadian stores around assumptions drawn from its US business and closed them within two years (Retail Dive). Wesfarmers converted the UK’s Homebase into Bunnings at speed, dropped product lines Homebase customers relied on, and sold the business in 2018 after more than A$1 billion in write-downs. Its chair said afterward that the company had moved too quickly and left customers behind (CNBC). In both cases the company carried a home playbook into a market it assumed would accept it.

    B2B expansion fails more quietly, which makes it harder to study and easier to repeat. The B2B version of the wrong product mix is positioning that signals credibility in one market and reads as overstated in another. The B2B version of the wrong supply chain is a sales process built around how buyers decided at home. KPMG interviewed Australian software companies expanding into the US. It found that Australian customers and investors carried little weight with American buyers, and that without US references the first sale was hard to land (KPMG). That kind of credibility gap rarely produces one dramatic loss. More often it shows up as a pipeline that moves a little slower than forecast, quarter after quarter, until someone asks why.

    What tends to hold up

    The companies that handle this well do the work they would do for a market they knew was foreign. Before they export their go-to-market, they take it apart and separate what carries the value from what was shaped by where they started. That means looking at which credentials buyers trust, how long decisions take, who sits in the room and what a confident claim sounds like. Most of it is invisible at home, because nobody there has reason to question it. I’ve written separately about how expansion tests go-to-market assumptions and why a local hire doesn’t solve it alone.

    What makes this difficult is that success in the home market is evidence for the playbook and against examining it. The longer something has worked, the harder it is to see which parts worked because of the product and which worked because of the place. Similar markets are where that question gets tested first, usually before anyone has thought to ask it.

  • Hiring doesn’t travel any better than marketing does

    Hiring doesn’t travel any better than marketing does

    I was recently talking with Geri Murphy, who works as a fractional Head of People across the US, UK, and Ireland, and we kept landing on the same pattern from opposite sides of the business. Companies assume they can extend what worked in one market into another, in how they sell and in how they hire, without fully understanding what made either one work in the first place.

    On the marketing side, that shows up as positioning that no longer lands cleanly, or demand that doesn’t convert the way it used to. I wrote about that half separately: The Go-to-Market Assumptions That Don’t Survive a New Market.

    This is the other half. On the hiring side, the drift looks different but comes from the same place.

    The assumption that carries over from the first market

    Expansion plans usually start from a reasonable premise: if the business works in one market, the task is to replicate it elsewhere with some adjustment. That applies to hiring as much as go-to-market.

    You take what already exists and extend it. A version of the org structure, a version of the role, a version of what “senior” or “self-directed” means. What’s less visible is how much of the original version was shaped by context.

    Hiring expectations, role definitions, and how quickly someone is expected to produce results are all influenced by the market the company grew up in. When those assumptions carry over unexamined, hiring starts to drift the same way marketing does, and usually at the same time.

    Where the breakdown usually begins

    The first signs are rarely dramatic. A new hire joins and spends more time than expected working out the role. They’re capable, but the expectations don’t map cleanly to what they’re seeing in the market day to day.

    In parallel, companies start making decisions that reflect pressure rather than clarity. Roles get compressed or redefined. There’s a growing tendency to assume certain functions can be reduced or replaced, particularly with AI in the mix, without fully thinking through who’s actually responsible for operating, interpreting, and checking that work.

    None of this shows up as a single point of failure. It creates friction across the system, the same way it does on the marketing side.

    What this looks like once you’re in-market

    An Australian company expanding into the US may find early hires spending more time sorting out expectations than building pipeline. The product resonates, but the role around it doesn’t map the way it did at home.

    A UK or Irish company entering North America may discover hiring profiles don’t translate cleanly. Someone highly effective in one market can struggle in another, not from a capability gap, but because the role itself is defined differently in practice.

    In some cases the shift is more structural. A company operating across the US and Canada may find geopolitical conditions shaping both hiring and sales in ways that weren’t there before. Decisions carry additional context. Messaging has to account for it. Hiring expectations shift alongside it.

    Why “just hire locally” rarely fixes it

    Bringing in someone from the market is often the right move. It’s also frequently treated as the whole fix.

    It works best as part of a clearer system. When the underlying structure isn’t well defined, local hires end up carrying more than it looks like from the outside. They’re not just executing. They’re interpreting the role, adapting to what they’re seeing, and making calls about how the business should actually operate in that market.

    That can produce strong early results, especially with the right person. It’s much harder to turn into something consistent. Over time the business accumulates multiple versions of its go-to-market and multiple interpretations of the same role, each one sensible on its own, hard to reconcile together.

    What tends to hold up instead

    Companies that handle this well spend time understanding how their current system actually works before extending it: not the formal version, the one that shows up in real decisions and real outcomes.

    From there it becomes translation rather than replication. Which parts of a role are essential. Which depend on context. How expectations need to adapt so marketing, sales, and hiring keep reinforcing each other instead of pulling apart.

    It can feel slower at the start. It tends to prevent a longer stretch of drift later.

    Expansion exposes what was already unclear

    International growth gets framed as an opportunity, and it is one. It’s also one of the fastest ways to find out where a company’s system was less clearly defined than it seemed.

    Marketing and hiring don’t break independently. They reflect the same underlying structure, and when that structure doesn’t fit the new market, both start to show it. What worked in one place can work in another, but only if the business understands its own system well enough to adapt it.